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PROPOSED UCC 2-103 OF THE 2000
VERSION OF THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
Ann Lousin*
N any statute, particularly any statute as complex and broad as The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the most fundamental issue is the
scope of the statute. Only when we know the extent of the statute, its
"scope," can we define the terms and determine the basic principles of
the statute. Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the most important
cases interpreting Article 2 of the UCC in the last forty years have con-
cerned current UCC 2-102, the "scope" provision.
The Article 2 drafting committee has admitted that one of the greatest
obstacles it has faced has been the re-definition of the scope of Article 2.
In the prefatory note to the July 2000 version of the draft revision of
Article 2, the committee highlighted its proposed scope section as one of
the "sections that are either new or controversial." It said:
Scope is listed first because it has been the most difficult issue facing
the Drafting Committee. Current Article 2's scope provision refers
simply to "transactions in goods." It does not address whether com-
puter information falls within the definition of goods. The Study Re-
port that preceded the drafting project identified this as an area that
required change given that many courts have applied Article 2's
rules to computer information transactions, either directly or by
analogy, in ways that lead to inappropriate results.'
The July 2000 version of the draft of Article 2 addresses the overriding
issue of the scope of Article 2: the role of computers and computer infor-
mation in an article normally reserved for "sales of goods." The revolu-
tion in information technology requires a change in the legal
underpinning of sales of goods.
The text of the current scope provision, UCC 2-102, reads as follows:
Sec. 2-102 Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions Ex-
cluded From This Article.
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transac-
tions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in
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the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is in-
tended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article
impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or
other specified classes of buyers. 2
The proposed scope section in the July 2000 draft reads as follows:
Section 2-103. Scope.
(a) This article applies to transactions in goods.
(b) If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this
article applies to the goods but not to the computer information or
informational rights in it. However, if a copy of a computer program
is contained in and sold or, pursuant to Section 2-313A or 2-313B,
leased as part of goods, this article applies to the copy and the com-
puter program unless:
(1) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
(2) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the
program is ordinarily a substantial purpose of transactions in
goods of the type sold or leased.
(c) In a transaction that includes computer information and goods,
then with regard to the goods, including any copy of a computer pro-
gram constituting goods under Section 2-102(a)(23), the parties may
not by agreement alter a result that would otherwise be required by
this article.
(d) This article does not apply to a foreign exchange transaction.
(e) If there is a conflict between this article and another article of
[the Uniform Commercial Code], that article governs.
[(f) If a transaction includes computer information and goods and
there is a conflict between this article and [the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act] over the extent to which this article
applies to a copy of a computer program under subsection (b), [the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act] governs.]
[(g) If there is a conflict between this article and [the Uniform Elec-
tronic Transactions Act], this article governs.] 3
Clearly, the drafting committee sought to retain the core of the present
scope provision, the phrase "transactions in goods." It also sought to
specify the role of computer technology in Article 2 and to indicate the
relationship between Article 2 and other articles of the UCC, as well as
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) and Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA).
This symposium article has three purposes: (1) to analyze the current
scope provision of Article 2 and some of the most important issues raised
in connection with cases arising in the last forty years; (2) to explain the
new material in the July 2000 draft, particularly the part relating to com-
puter transactions; and (3) to explain the new material in the November
2000 and February 2001 drafts.
2. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1999).
3. U.C.C. § 2-103 (Proposed Draft July 2000).
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I. THE CURRENT ARTICLE 2 SCOPE PROVISION
There are two types of cases on the scope of Article 2: those defining
"transactions" and those defining "in goods."
4
The prototype "transaction" is, of course, a sale of goods. Indeed, the
title of Article 2 is "Sales." Most of the cases on "transactions" have
involved "leases" of goods. In some cases courts applied Article 2, either
directly or by analogy, while in other cases they applied the law relating
to bailments of personal property.5 The adoption of Article 2A-Leases of
Goods as part of the UCC has rendered these cases obsolete. However,
there have been conflicting cases involving bailments of goods,6 and there
is no reason to believe that bailments will no longer be a scope issue
under the current or proposed Article 2. Theoretically, it is also possible
for a court to apply Article 2 to a donation, an exchange of goods for
goods and even taking from a decedent's estate, either by will or by intes-
tacy. Such cases, however, do not seem to arise.
Most litigation on the scope of Article 2 continues to revolve around
"in goods." Sometimes a sale of goods is combined with a provision or
sale of service. At other times, there are goods and real estate in the same
sale, or goods and intangibles, such as good will; there are sales of going
business concerns, with goods and non-goods joined together; and there
are sales or licenses of utilities or computer software.
The principal method of deciding whether Article 2 governs these cases
is the "predominant feature test" or "predominant factor test." The test
requires the court to determine whether the principal part of the transac-
tion is a sale of goods. From the earliest cases enunciating the predomi-
nant feature test,7 the courts have had great leeway in determining the
factors they will examine in making the determination. The cases involv-
ing both a sale of goods and the providing of service are decidedly mixed.
If there is one clear trend, it would be that the service of installing pur-
chased goods is merely "incidental" to the predominant feature of selling
goods to the buyer.8
4. To a lesser extent, there is a third type, cases attempting to divided Article 2 trans-
actions from Article 9 transactions, which involve security interests. Since these cases do
not seem to be part of the Article 2 revision, they are not part of this discussion.
5. There were even splits within a state. In Illinois, for example, there were Walter E.
Heller & Co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home of the First Church of Deliverance, 365 N.E.2d
1285 (1997) and Dillman & Associates, Inc. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 442 N.E.2d 311 (1982),
in both of which cases the court applied Article 2 by analogy to leases of goods. But there
was also Builder's Concrete Co. of Morton v. Fred Faubel & Sons, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 863
(1978), in which the court applied ordinary contracts law, as it would have done for an
ordinary bailment contract.
6. Compare Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (holding that a bail-
ment to splice camera film fell within Article 2) with Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc.,
422 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. App. 1981) (holding that bailment to develop camera film fell
outside Article 2).
7. The most famous early case is Epstein v. Giannattasio, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
8. The two most recent "supply and install" contracts held that Article 2 applied.
Fournier Furniture, Inc. v. Waltz-Hoist Blow Pipe Co., 980 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Va. 1997)
(involving the "design, fabrication and installation of a furnace"); EMSG Sys. Div., Inc. v.
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The predominant feature test has also played a role in deciding
whether a sale of goods and other objects, not just services, falls under
Article 2. For example, a majority of the courts have applied the predom-
inant feature test in deciding whether Article 2 applied to the sale of a
going business concern or a sale of goods and real estate or other non-
goods.9 On the other hand, at least one court divided the items to be sold
into goods and the various non-goods components and then applied Arti-
cle 2 to the sale of the goods, real estate or contracts law to the sale of the
real property and other laws to the sale of other items.10
The "gravamen of the action" test is an alternative to the predominant
feature test. This theory, proposed by Professor William D. Hawkland,
requires the court to determine which part of the contract-the goods or
the service or other non-goods-caused the alleged breach of contract or
harm. If the goods caused the breach or harm, then the court should
apply Article 2; if the non-goods caused the breach or harm, it should
apply the appropriate law other than Article 2. Although some judges
have approved of this test," it has never achieved the acceptance that the
predominant feature test has enjoyed.
In short, the drafting committee apparently intends to continue the
case law interpreting "transactions in goods." By adopting the exact lan-
guage that has been the subject of forty years of litigation and commen-
tary, the committee has validated the current state of the case law. Under
the current case law, the predominant feature test enjoys more popularity
than either the "dividing the items" test or the "gravamen of the action"
test. Presumably, therefore, the case law will continue to develop as
before.
The exception to this statement will be the cases involving computers
and computer information. Those cases will give way to the specific new
provisions on computer technology in subsections (b) and (c) of proposed
UCC 2-103.
II. THE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION
PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED UCC 2-103
Subsections (b) and (c) of proposed UCC 2-103 address the issues re-
lating to whether computer information (software) is truly "goods" and
whether a hybrid sale of "goods" and computer-related items falls under
Article 2 or is treated in a different fashion.
The definition of "goods" in the present Article 2 is in UCC 2-105. The
first sentence reads: "(1) 'Goods' means all things (including specially
Miltope Corp., 37 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 39 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (concerning the special manufacture
of circuit boards, presumably with installation).
9. E.g., Field v. Golden Triangle Broad., Inc., 305 A.2d 689 (1973).
10. Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967).
11. As recently as in 1999, in a case concerning the purchase of oil, with certain non-
goods aspects also involved, the court applied this test, although it is not clear whether
non-Code law would have changed the result. Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
[Vol. 54
PROPOSED UCC 2-103
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action."' 12
The touchstone of "movability" solves most issues on the definition of
"goods" and clearly separates sales of personal property from sales of
real property. However, movability does not help in deciding situations
involving computer technology and information. The definition of
"goods" in proposed UCC 2-102(a)(23) reads:
(23) 'Goods' means all things, including specially manufactured
goods, that are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale. The term includes the unborn young of animals, growing
crops, other identified things to be severed from realty under Section
2-107, and a copy of a computer program to which this article applies
under Section 2-103(b). The term does not include money in which
the price is to be paid, other computer information, the subject mat-
ter of foreign exchange transactions, documents, letters of credit, let-
ter-of-credit rights, instruments, investment property, accounts,
chattel paper, deposit accounts, or general intangibles. 13
The Preliminary Comment to this definition says that the purpose of
this revision was "to make it clear that 'goods' includes a copy of a com-
puter program that is subject to this Article pursuant to Section 2-103(b)
but does not include other computer information.' 1 4 Although the new
matter raises the issue of definitions of several new words, 15 the key defi-
nition seems to be that of "computer program." Proposed UCC 2-
102(a)(8) defines it as: "'Computer program' means a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about
a certain result. The term does not include separately identifiable infor-
mational content.' 16
The Preliminary Comment to this definition says that a "computer pro-
gram is a type of computer information" and indicates that the first sen-
tence of the definition is related to U.S. copyright law. 17 Although
computer technology changes at the drop of a disc, these definitions
should remain stable and useful for some time to come.
The case law on whether computer technology (whether computer pro-
grams or informational content) can fall under the present definition of
"goods" is mixed, even garbled. One of the most recent cases, Triple
Point Technology, Inc. v. D.N.L. Risk Management, Inc.,18 illustrates the
12. U.C.C. § 2-105 (1999).
13. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(23) (Proposed Draft July 2000).
14. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(23) prelim. cmt. (Proposed Draft July 2000).
15. The Proposed Draft listing several new and important definitions states: "[o]ther
definitions relevant to this issue are computer information (Section 2-102(a)(7)), computer
program (Section 2-102(a)(8)), copy (section 2-102(a)(14)), goods (Section 2-102(a)(23)),
information (Section 2-102(a)(24)), informational content (Section 2-102(a)(25)), and in-
formational rights (Section 2-102(a)(26)).
16. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(8) (Proposed Draft July 2000).
17. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(8) prelim. cmt. (Proposed Draft July 2000).
18. 41 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 421 (D.C.N.J. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
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difficulties. The defendant agreed to sell its "intellectual property rights"
in a software program, including the "proprietary products, all source
codes of software products ... as well as all trademarks, copyrights and
patents... ."19 The court applied a "primary purpose" test and held that
the subject of the bargain was "ownership of the program itself" and that
containing the program "on a floppy disk or CD-ROM for transfer does
not bring this agreement under the purview of the U.C.C. '20 The court
discussed several cases on the sale of computer information. Notably, it
distinguished Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.,21 which included a
sale of hardware and software, as well as the provision of ongoing techni-
cal assistance. The Triple Point Technology court emphasized that the
Advent Systems buyer "bargained for software on disk to resell," while
Triple Point "bargained for ownership of the program itself."'2 2 While
some might say this is a difference without a true distinction, the result
was that Article 2 did not apply in Triple Point Technology because the
subject of this sale was intellectual property, not "goods."
Both the proposed scope section, especially proposed Section 2-103(b)
and (c), and the proposed definitions of "goods" (proposed Sec. 2-102
(a)(23)) and "computer program" (proposed Sec. 2-102 (a)(8)) offer a
way out of this confusion.
What would have been the results in Advent Systems and Triple Point
Technology if proposed Section 2-103 had been in effect? The first sen-
tence of proposed Section 2-103(b) seems tailor-made for Advent Sys-
tems, since both "computer information" and "goods" (hardware) were
the subjects of the sale. Therefore, the proposed Article 2 would apply to
the situation in that case, just as the court held that present Article 2
applied to it. Moreover, as the report to proposed Section 2-103 indicates,
"[if] a copy of a computer program is embedded in goods that are sold,
the first sentence of subsection (b) provides that the sale of the goods is
governed by this Article. '23
The major difficulties in interpreting proposed Section 2-103(b) begin
with the second sentence. In reading its complicated rules and excep-
tions, it is necessary to refer to the report of the drafting committee. 24
The following appear to be the results:
1. If the copy of the computer program is contained in goods that are
sold or leased to a remote buyer or lessee, proposed Article 2 applies to
both the copy and the computer program.
2. However, point 1 is not true if the "goods" involved are a "com-
puter" or "computer peripheral." Proposed Section 2-102(a)(6) defines
"computer." There is apparently no statutory definition of "computer pe-
ripheral." The report says, "The test for application of this Article is
19. Id. at 424.
20. Id. at 424-25.
21. 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
22. Triple Point Tech., 41 U.C.C. Rep. 2d at 425.




never satisfied, however, if the goods themselves are a computer or com-
puter peripheral. '25 Can this mean that a computer-a machine, hard-
ware-is not within Article 2? Surely not, but the text and report are
confusing here.
3. Also, point 1 is not true if "giving the buyer or lessee of the goods
access to or use of the program is ordinarily a substantial purpose" of this
type of goods transaction. The report indicates that the source of this
exception is UCITA, Sec. 103(b)(1) and that the only difference from
UCITA is the substitution of "substantial" for "material. 12 6 The report
suggests "more than merely nontrivial" as a definition of "substantial. '
27
Subsection (c) of proposed Section 2-103 completes the section's treat-
ment of computer-related matters that may or may not fall within the
scope of proposed Article 2. It addresses a "transaction that includes
computer information and goods." Under subsection (c), as far as the
"goods" are concerned, the parties may not agree to "alter a result" oth-
erwise required by the proposed article. This prohibition extends to a
"copy of a computer program constituting goods."'28
Although this language might be broad enough to forbid parties to opt
in or opt out of Article 2, the report suggests a more limited reading. It
says that the language prevents parties from opting out of the mandatory
rules in UCC § 1-102(3).29 If this is so, one has to wonder why subsection
(c) of proposed Section 2-103 is necessary.
III. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTION PROVISION
OF PROPOSED UCC 2-103
Proposed Section 2-103(d) is new. Under present UCC § 2-102 and
UCC § 2-105(1), money can be either a "commodity," i.e., the subject of
the sale, or the "price to be paid." In the former situation, the money is
considered "goods," and the transaction falls within present Article 2,
while in the latter situation, the money is not "goods," and the transac-
tion falls outside present Article 2. It has not been difficult to distinguish
between the two situations. In the 1990's the reported cases have dealt
with foreign currency. 30
Proposed Article 2 continues this distinction through the definition of
"goods" in proposed Section 2-102(a)(23), which in this respect continues
the present definition in UCC § 2-105(1). That new definition also specif-




28. U.C.C. § 2-103(c) (Proposed Draft July 2000).
29. U.C.C. § 2-103 note (Proposed Draft July 2000).
30. All arose in New York and apparently held that foreign currency exchange con-
tracts fall within Article 2. Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), 157 A.D.2d 278 (1990);
Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641 (1991); In re Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992); Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v.
IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 785 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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"goods." However, proposed Section 2-103(d) specifically adds another
exclusion: "foreign exchange transactions." The definition of "foreign ex-
change transactions" in proposed Section 2-102(a)(20) centers upon the
medium of delivery, that of "through funds transfer, book entry account-
ing, or other form of payment order, or other agreed means to transfer a
credit balance."'31
The report to this proposed section indicates that Article 4A "or other
applicable law" would apply.32 The report specifies, however, that an ex-
change of U.S. currency for foreign currency-the example given is Eu-
ros-would not be a "foreign exchange transaction" and would fall within
Article 2.33 Presumably, the recent case law, the clear language of the
proposed text and the report will combine to prevent significant confu-
sion over this new exclusion.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED ARTICLE 2 WITH
OTHER ARTICLES OF THE CODE
Proposed Section 2-103(e) provides that in case of a "conflict" between
the proposed article and another article of the Code, the other article
"governs. '34 The report says that the provision is new and suggests that
the most likely area for "overlap," if not actual "conflict," would be with
Article 9.35 The only assistance it gives in defining "conflict" is the last
paragraph: "Subsection (e) is intended to operate in one direction only;
that is, to subordinate Article 2 to any inconsistent rule found in another
Article. It should not be construed to permit a provision from Article 2
to be injected into another Article. '36
Presumably, the courts will follow their usual practice and try hard not
to find any "inconsistency" and therefore a "conflict" between the pro-
posed Article 2 and other articles of the Code.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPOSED ARTICLE 2
AND UCITA
Proposed Sections 2-103(f) and (g) are the two optional subsections. If
a state has adopted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), it should adopt subsection (f) in order to reconcile "conflicts"
between proposed Article 2 and UCITA. If a state has adopted the Uni-
form Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), it should adopt subsection (g)
in order to reconcile "conflicts" between proposed Article 2 and UETA.
The drafters of proposed Article 2 adopted opposite stances on the rela-
tionship between Article 2 and UCITA and between Article 2 and
UETA.
31. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(20) (Proposed Draft July 2000).
32. Id. § 2-103 note.
33. Id.





According to proposed Section 2-103(f), if there is a conflict between
the proposed Article 2 and UCITA, UCITA governs. The report indi-
cates that the "narrower" definition of "computer" in the 1999 version of
proposed Article 2 was
consistent with UCITA's corresponding definition. Since then, the
definition in UCITA has been broadened. The 2000 Draft differs
from UCITA in that it retains the narrower definition. Section 2-
102(a)(6).
The 'material' purpose test of UCITA has been modified to a 'sub-
stantial' purpose test in the 2000 Draft; that is, Article 2 applies to an
embedded computer program unless the goods are a computer or
computer peripheral or gaining access to or use of the program itself
is ordinarily a substantial purpose in transactions of the type at issue.
Section 2-103(b)(2).
The change was made to avoid the historical baggage associated with
'material,' which generally means nontrivial. 'Substantial' requires
that the purpose of gaining access to or use of the program be more
than merely nontrivial. It does not require that the purpose be
dominant. 37
Apart from the differing definitions of "computer" and the difference
between "substantial" and "material," it is unclear when a "conflict" be-
tween proposed Article 2 and UCITA would arise. UCITA is a special-
ized uniform act that took a decade to produce. 38
The scope provision of UCITA echoes parts of proposed Section 2-103,
especially proposed Sections 2-103(b) and (c). Subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 103 of UCITA reads:
(a) This [Act] applies to computer information transactions.
(b) Except for subject matter excluded in subsection (d) and as oth-
erwise provided in Section 104, if a computer information transac-
tion includes subject matter other than computer information or
subject matter excluded under subsection (d), the following rules
apply:
(1) If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this
[Act] applies to the part of the transaction involving computer infor-
mation, informational rights in it, and creation or modification of it.
However, if a copy of a computer program is contained in and sold
or leased as part of goods, this [Act] applies to the copy and the
computer program only if:
(A) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
37. Id. § 2-103 note.
38. In the early 1990's, those involved in re-drafting Article 2 considered a "hub and
spokes" organization under which topics common to all, or almost all, contracts somewhat
related to sales of goods would be in the core or "hub" of the article. More specialized
kinds of contracts would have been in "spokes" of the article. Under this plan, computer
topics would have been in a "spoke." When this concept failed, it was proposed that there
be an Article 2B in the U.C.C. However, there was opposition to inserting an article on
computer transactions into the U.C.C. The substance of Article 2B is now UCITA, a uni-
form act completely separate from the U.C.C.
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(B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the
program is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of
the type sold or leased.39
Clearly, the key to the scope of UCITA is the definition of a "computer
information transaction" in Section 102(11). As the Official Comment
indicates, these transactions are "agreements that deal with the creation,
modification, access to, license or distribution of computer informa-
tion."'40 Another key to understanding the scope of UCITA, especially as
it relates to proposed Article 2, is this part of the Official Comment: "[I]f
a transaction is a computer information transaction, but also involves
other subject matter, this Act ordinarily applies only to the aspects of the
transaction that involve 'computer information."' 41
In short, the scope of the proposed Article 2, as it relates to computers,
is inextricable from the scope of UCITA. Proposed Section 2-103(b)
may now be read as attempting to divide some kinds of "mixed" com-
puter transactions so that the proposed Article 2 will apply to the
"goods" part and UCITA will apply to the "computer information" part.
In effect, there may be a built-in "gravamen of the action" test for certain
"mixed" computer transactions. Yet, subsection (f) of proposed Section
2-103 clearly gives the advantage to UCITA in case of a "conflict" with
the proposed Article 2. When could there really be a "conflict" (or "in-
consistency") if the transaction is truly to be divided into two discrete
parts? The answer is not clear.
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPOSED ARTICLE 2
AND UETA
In contrast, the drafters of the proposed Article 2 decided to
subordinate the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act to the proposed
Article 2 in case of conflict. The report to proposed Section 2-103(g) sug-
gests that the drafters adopted some UETA provisions "sometimes di-
rectly and sometimes with modifications," but does not specify which
adoptions occurred.42 Then the report adds what amounts to a plea to
judges for harmonization between the two statutes:
Because the application of that Act to transactions within the scope
of this Article has been carefully considered, it is appropriate that
this Article govern in the event of conflict. Subsection (g). Every
effort should be made to construe the relevant provisions in a consis-
tent manner before determining that a conflict exists. 43
This might suggest that the drafters saw more potential for a conflict
between the proposed Article 2 and UETA than between the proposed
Article 2 and UCITA. There is no provision for "dividing the items of the
39. U.C.I.T.A. § 103(a), (b), (2000) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll.
40. Id. § 103, cmt. 2 (2000).
41. Id.




transaction" as there is in an Article 2 versus UCITA transaction. How-
ever, when one reads the scope provision of UETA, there actually seems
to be less potential for conflict with the proposed Article 2.
UETA "applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating
to a transaction." 4 4 The exceptions to that statement of coverage and the
Official Comment make it clear that virtually all commercial transactions
fall within UETA, while non-commercial transactions fall outside
UETA.45 The scope of UETA is fundamentally similar to, if perhaps
slightly broader than, that of the Electronic Signatures in Global and Na-
tional Commerce Act (E-sign) adopted by the federal government in
2000.46
The purpose of UETA and the federal E-sign statute is to facilitate
electronic signatures and to make them equal to ordinary signatures in
force and validity. This purpose and the provisions of both UETA and E-
sign are thus much narrower in application than either UCITA or the
proposed Article 2. Therefore, despite the hints of greater potential con-
flict contained in the report to the proposed Article 2, there really does
not seem to be much potential conflict between UETA (or E-sign) and
the proposed Article 2.
VII. THE DRAFTS AFTER THE JULY 2000 DRAFT
The third purpose of the article is to explain the changes in the "scope"
provision in the two drafts written since July 2000. In its November 2000
draft, the Article 2 Revision Drafting Committee made no changes to
proposed UCC § 2-103 of the July 2000 draft. 47 However, the February
2001 draft of proposed Article 2 suggests a substantial change from both
present UCC 2-102 and the proposed UCC § 2-103 in the July 2000 draft.
The February 2001 draft proposed the following scope provision:
2-103 SCOPE
(a) This article applies to transactions in goods.
(b) If a transaction includes goods and a copy of a computer pro-
gram, the following rules apply:
(1) This article applies to the goods.
(2) If appropriate, this article, including provisions that by their
terms are applicable to "goods," also applies to the product con-
sisting of the goods and the copy considered as a whole. Factors
that may be considered in deciding whether it is appropriate to
apply this article to that product include whether acquiring the
copy is incidental to acquiring the goods, the manner in which the
copy is associated with the goods, the nature of and circumstances
44. U.E.T.A. § 3(a) (2000).
45. U.E.T.A. § 3(b)(c), (d) and Official Comment 1, which reads in part: "The scope
of this Act is inherently limited by the fact that it only applies to transactions related to
business, commercial (including consumer) and governmental matters."
46. 15 U.S.C. § 7001-6, 7021, 7031.
47. U.C.C. § 2-103 preliminary comment (Proposed Draft Nov. 2000) (indicating no
change to the scope provision).
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surrounding the transaction, and whether the copy is subject to a
license.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed, with respect to a copy of a com-
puter program that is part of a product to which, considered as a
whole, this article applies:
(A) warranties created pursuant to Section 2-312 are limited
in application to the buyer's right to use the copy of the com-
puter program as part of the goods; and
(B) any provision of this article that would transfer title or
any other ownership rights to goods is limited in effect to trans-
ferring to the buyer the right to use the copy of the computer
program as part of the goods.
(c) This article does not apply to a foreign exchange transaction.
(d) If there is a conflict between this article and another article of
[the Uniform Commercial Code], that article governs.48
The February 2001 draft replicates only the "transactions in goods" lan-
guage of the current "scope" provision, UCC 2-102. The February 2001
draft retains some parts of the July 2000 draft regarding "scope," but
makes substantial changes in the treatment of transactions involving com-
puters, UCITA and UETA.
Section 2-103(a) of the February 2001 draft continues the language re-
garding "transactions in goods" in Section 2-103(a) of the July 2000 draft.
Section 2-103(c) of the February 2001 draft continues the exclusion of
"foreign exchange transactions" in Section 2-103(d) of the July 2000 draft.
Section 2-103(d) of the February 2001 draft continues the subordination
of Article 2 to other articles in case of conflict that was contained in Sec-
tion 2-103(e).
However, the February 2001 draft omits all references to UCITA and
UETA, thereby eliminating the substance of Section 2-103(f) and (g) in
the July 2000 draft. The deletion of these references is combined with a
substantial revision of Section 2-103(b) and (c) in the July 2000 draft. In
effect, the detailed provisions regarding the applicability of a sales article
to computer software are much simplified. Clearly, there is no way to
specify the situations in which it would be "appropriate" to apply Article
2 to sales of goods plus "a copy of a computer program." However, the
"factors" listed in Section 2-103(b)(2) of the February 2001 draft attempt
to give guidance to the interpreter.
One is left with the impression that the drafting committee is now con-
tent to apply a version of the "predominant feature" test to a sale of
goods and a copy of a computer program. If the goods are the predomi-
nant feature and the copy of the computer program only incidental to the
sale of the goods, then Article 2 would govern both parts of the sale: the
goods and the copy of the computer program. Part 4 of the Preliminary
Comment to Section 2-103 of the February 2001 draft even discusses the
48. U.C.C. § 2-103 (Proposed Draft Feb. 2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
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"predominant purpose" test and the cases employing it.49 However, the
same comment also discusses a possible application of the "gravamen of
the action" test, which may be a hint that this less-frequently-used test
could also apply to a sale of goods and a computer program. 50
One is also left with the impression that the drafting committee de-
cided it is wise to conform the proposed Article 2 to the revision of Arti-
cle 9 due to become effective July 1, 2001. Revised UCC § 9-102(a)(44)
defines "goods," a key term in secured transactions law, to "include"
a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting infor-
mation provided in connection with a transaction relating to the pro-
gram if (1) the program is associated with the goods in such a
manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods, or (2) by
becoming the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use
the program in connection with the goods. The term does not in-
clude a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of
the medium in which the program is embedded.51
Although the language suggested by the Article 2 Revision Drafting
Committee is not identical to that in the revised Article 9 definition of
"goods," it is close enough that one might conclude that the intent is the
same: a computer program that is an integral part of the "goods" simply
becomes part of the "goods" for purposes of discussing definitions and
scope. Computer programs that run functions in certain goods-the anti-
lock braking systems of cars, for example-are, in effect, part of the
"goods."
This approach is a distinct departure from that taken by the Article 2
Revision Drafting Committee in July 2000. Clearly, the debate over how
to treat the subject of computers-copies of computer programs, UCITA
and UETA-goes on.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the proposed Article 2 have decided to retain the basic
scope provision in present UCC § 2-102: "transactions in goods." How-
ever, by changing the definition of "goods" in present UCC § 2-105(1) to
a certain extent, they are, in effect, changing the scope somewhat.
The most dramatic change they propose concerns the area of com-
puters. By inserting definitions relating to computers from other stat-
utes-specifically UCITA and UETA-and attempting to mesh those
statutes with the proposed Article 2, the drafters have entered the won-
derful world of computer law. The text and report of the July 2000 draft
of the proposed Article 2 is not entirely clear about where Article 2 will
govern computer-related transactions and where other statutes, especially
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Revised U.C.C. 9-102(a)(44).
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UCITA, will govern. The February 2001 draft is also not clear. If a fu-
ture draft does not clarify the line between the proposed Article 2 and the
computer-related statutes, eventually the courts will have to draw that
line.
